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Virginia's New "Long Arm" Statute
J. WESTWOOD SMITHERS

At its recent 1964 session, the General Assembly of
Virginia enacted a statute which will widely expand the
jurisdiction of our courts over nonresidents. The purpose of this brief editorial is to call attention to the new
law, to provide a copy of it for our readers, and to make
a few rather cursory comments on its significance.
In 1957, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in
McGee v. InternatioalLife Insuranmc Co., 355 U. S. 220,
said:
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed.
565 [1878], this Court has held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places some
limit on the power of state courts to enter binding
judgments against persons not served with process
within their boundaries. But just where this line of
limitation falls has been the subject of prolific controversy, particularly with respect to foreign corporations. In a continuing process of evolution this
Court accepted and then abandoned "consent," "doing business," and "presence" as the standard for
measuring the extent of state judicial power over
such corporations. .

.

. More recently in Interna-

tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S.
310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 [19451, the Court
decided that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in persowam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substant-
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ial justice.' "Id., 326 U. S. at page 316, 66 S. Ct. at
page 158.
Looking back over this long history of litigation
a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the
permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is
attributable to the fundamental transformation of
our national economy over the years. Today many
commercial transactions touch two or more States
and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the
same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity.
Until now, Virginia has not chosen to exercise all the
power that it possesses within "the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other
nonresidents." For example, with reference to foreign
corporations that have failed to obtain a certificate of
authority to transact business in this state, our courts
are authorized by our statutes to exercise jurisdiction
only if the activities of such corporations are sufficient to
constitute "transacting business" in this state. Va. Code
Ann. § 13.1-119 (Repl. Vol. 1956). The phrase "transacting business" seems to mean nothing more than "doing
business." Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Wertz, 249 F. 2d 813
(4th Cir. 1957). Thus Virginia has not heretofore taken
advantage of the Thternationa Shoe Co.. decision, supra,
to extend its judicial powers over foreign corporations
whose activities in the state may not be sufficient to constitute "doing business," but which may be sufficient to
constitute "minimum contacts" with the state "such -as
to make the exercise of judicial jurisdiction reasonable."
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Restatement (Second), Colr.ICT oF LAws § 74 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1956).
Similarly, Virginia has not heretofore asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident individual doing business in
the state through an agent, although the Supreme Court
held almost thirty years ago that it was within the constitutional powers of the state to exercise such jurisdiction. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
It was the purpose of Senate Bill No. 266 (copied below) to fill these and other gaps so as to extend the jurisdiction of our courts over nonresidents (including individuals, partnerships, and corporations) substantially to
the outermost limits permissible under Supreme Court
decisions. The gist of the new law is found in § 8-81.2
of the bill, which - except for one paragraph - was
taken verbatim from § 1.03 of the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act. 9B U.L.A., 1963 Pocket
Part, p. 75. (This Act was approved by the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1962.) But paragraph (5) of
§ 8-81.2 is original in Virginia -andwas thought desirable
in order to make sure that actions for breach of warranty
in the sale of goods could be brought in Virginia, in many
situations, even though the sale of goods took place outside the state. The provisions of this paragraph are related to Virginia's recent statute abolishing the defense
of "lack of privity" in breach of warranty actions. See
Va. Code Ann. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1962), which will become
part of the Uniform Commercial Code in Virginia as
§2-318 thereof. The new Act follows:
SENATE BILL NO. 266
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That the Code of Virginia be amended by adding
in Title 8 a chapter, numbered 4.1, containing sections numbered 8-81.1 through 8-81.5, as follows:
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Chapter 4.1
§ 8-81.1. As used in this chapter, "person" includes an individual, his executor, administrator, or
other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of
this State and whether or not organized under the
laws of this State.
§ 8-81.2. ('a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person s
(1) transacting any business in this State;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in
this State;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission
in this State;
(4) causing tortious injury in this State by an
-act or omission outside this State if he regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this State;
(5) causing injury in this State to any person
by breach of warranty expressly or bnpliedly made
in the sale of goods outside this State when he might
reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this State, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered in this State;
(6) having an interest in, using, or possessing real
property in this State; or
(7) contracting to insure any person, property, or
risk located within this State at the time of contracting.
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(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based
solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him; provided, however, nothing contained in this chapter shall limit, restrict or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of any court of this State
over foreign corporations which are subject to service of process pursuant to the provisions of any
other statute.
§ 8-81.3. (a) When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this chapter, service of process or notice may be made in the same manner as
is provided for elsewhere in this code in any other
case in which personal jurisdiction is exercised over
such a nonresident party, and, if there be no such
provision, then process or notice may be served on
any agent of such person in the county o.r city in this
State in which he resides or on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Virginia who, for this purpose,
shall be deemed to be the statutory agent of such
person.
(b) Service of such process or notice shall be made
by leaving a copy of the process or notice, together
with a fee of three dollars, plus one dollar additional
for each defendant over one to be thus served, in
the hands of the Secretary of the Commonwealth or
in his office in the city of Richmond, Virginia, and
such service shall be sufficient upon the nonresident,
provided that notice of such service and a copy of
the process or notice are forthwith sent by registered
or certified mail, with delivery receipt requested, by
the Secretary of the Commonwealth to the defendant
or defendants at such defendant's or defend-ants'
last known postoffice address, and an affidavit of
compliance herewith by the Secretary of the Commonwealth or some one designated by him for that
purpose and having knowledge of such compliance,

VIRGINIA'S NEW "LONG ARM" STATUTE

93

shall be forthwith filed with the papers in the action.
§ 8-81.4. When -the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by this chapter, any action or suit
may be brought as provided in § 8-38 or, if not thereby provided for, it may be brought in the county or
corporation wherein the plaintiff resides or where
the cause of -action or any part thereof arose.
§ 8-81.5. A court of this State may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis authorized by law.
2. If any provision of this chapter or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions
or applications of the chapter which can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application,
and to this end the provisions of this chapter are
severable.

